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In the summer of 1887, James J . Hill extended the St. 
Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad (or Manitoba 
Railroad) westward from Minot, Dakota Territory, to Helena, 
Montana Territory. He achieved this Montana extension, a 
staggering 643 miles, only by painstaking planning and 
execution.(I) Of the multiple problems Hill faced, the 
Fort Berthold and Blackfeet Reservations proved to be among 
the most formidable. Hi 11 achieved most of his goals 
concerning his Montana penetration, a fact all the more 
impressive considering the youth of the Manitoba Railway.
In 1881 the Manitoba Railroad was a small yet 
remarkably successful railway dominating the north—south 
axis between Minneapolis and Winnipeg. This railway owed 
its extraordinary success to two factors: its hegemony over
transportâtion in the Red River Valley and extensive land 
grants in that valley.(2)
James J. Hill, the leading force among the Manitoba's 
directors, understood that a small branch railway, however 
successful, could not long survive without a 
transcontinental connection. Hill's arch—rival railroad, 
the Northern Pacific, forced him to look northward to 
Canada for that linkage. Hill envisioned an alliance with 
the Canadian Pacific Railroad, a company reorganized in the 
late 1870's and with plans to become Canada's first
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transcontinental railway. He wanted the Canadian Pacific 
to route south of Lake Superior, enter the United States at 
Sault St. Marie, cross Michigan and Wisconsin, and then 
proceed to Winnipeg via Hill's Manitoba Railroad. By 1880, 
however, the Canadian Pacific had chosen an all—Canadian 
route and Hill's plans evaporated.(3)
At that point. Hill probably determined that the 
Manitoba would have to build its own transcontinental road, 
sandwiched between the Canadian Pacific and the Northern 
Pacific Railroads. Hill's biographers, Joseph Gilpin Pyle 
and Albro Martin, maintain that Hill had for many years 
envisioned his own transcontinental railway, though neither 
can pinpoint an exact date when that vision translated into 
a concrete p l an.(4)
As early as 1881, competition from large Chicago—based 
railroads, and particularly the formidable Chicago, 
Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad (or Milwaukee Railroad), 
probably forced Hill to begin his westward expansion.(5>
By 1883 Hill reached the north shore of Devil's Lake in 
Dakota Territory— eighty miles west of the Red River. In 
1886 the Manitoba reached the small western Dakota town of 
Minot, named after the Manitoba’s recently hired 
Vice-President, Henry D. Minot. (6) At Mi not, however, the 
Manitoba stalled.
Obstructing the Manitoba were the Fort Berthold and
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the Blackfeet Reservations. Indian lands had always posed 
unique problems for railroads. Legally, Indian 
reservations were not public lands and railroads needed 
special permission from the federal government in order to 
secure right-of-way easements. This contrasted with 
easements across public lands which had been assured by 
general statute in 1875.<7>
As can be seen from Figure 1, Fort Berthold proved to 
be the immediate obstacle. The so-called "Three Affiliated 
Tribes," composed of the Arikara, Mandan, and Gros Ventre, 
resided on this reservation which President Grant had 
established by executive order in 1870 (see Figure 3). 
Except for a tiny strip of land, this reservation 
restricted the Affiliated Tribes to lands south of the 
Missouri River in western Dakota and eastern Montana 
Territories.(8)
In 1 G^80, and again by executive order. President Hayes 
substantially reduced the reservation. By this order Hayes 
did two important things: First, he extinguished all
Berthold lands in Montana Territory and a significant 
portion in Dakota Territory; Second, he extended the 
reservation with a large strip of land north of the 
Missouri.(9) (See Figure 1) This executive order was also 
conspicuously favorable to the interests of the Northern 
Pacific Railroad.
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The Northern Pacific crossed directly through the 1870 
reservation and President Hayes clearly wanted to open to 
public domain all Berthold lands within the Northern 
Pacific's forty mile land grant tier- In fact, his 
executive order specifically used the Northern Pacific's 
land grant boundary in determining the Berthold lands to be 
extinguished.
More curious was the extension north of the Missouri 
River- Hayes had departed from the precedent of previous 
federal agreements with the the Fort Berthold tribes- 
Except for one minor exception, the federal government had 
never formally acknowledged Fort Berthold Indian claims 
north of the Missouri River. The 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty 
restricted the Three Affiliated Tribes to lands south of 
the Missouri (lO)- President Brant's 1870 Executive Order 
confined the Berthold tribes to the south side of the 
Missouri, except for a tiny strip north of the river which 
included the already existing Indian village of 
Berthold-(11)
This extension of the Fort Berthold Reservation north 
of the Missouri River lay directly in the path of the 
Manitoba Railroad were it to build toward the Pacific 
coast- Granted, at this time the Manitoba was confined to 
the Red River Valley and posed no explicit threat to the 
Northern Pacific- However, even at this early stage the
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Northern Pacific carefully monitored any efforts by Hill to 
extend the Manitoba westward.(12) Evidence implicating 
Northern Pacific collusion in this Fort Berthold extension 
remains only circumstantial and may be investigated in 
greater detail by other inquirers.
For James J . Hill the Blackfeet Reservation— an
enormous land tract probably posed greater potential
problems than the isolated strip of the Fort Berthold 
Reservation. Containing Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, Gros 
Ventre, River Crow, Assiniboine and Yanktonai Sioux 
Indians, the massive Blackfeet Reservation extended across 
all of northern Montana from the Dakota line to the Rocky 
Mountain divide.(13) The 1855 Blackfeet Treaty created 
the reservation, although the boundaries had changed in the 
three decades prior to Hill's 1886 arrival. As defined in 
the 1855 treaty, the western part of the reservation dipped 
southward to the Sun River, and the eastern limit extended 
to the mouth of the Milk River, near the present western 
boundary of the Fort Peck Reservation. President Grant in 
1873 extended the eastern boundary to the Dakota 
b order.(14) The following year, 1874, Congress 
extinguished the Blackfeet land title between the Sun and 
the Marias Rivers-<15)
Theoretically Hill could have bypassed the Blackfeet 
Reservation, perhaps veering southward between the Missouri
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and Yellowstone Rivers and closer to the Northern Pacific 
Railroad— as the Milwaukee Railroad would later do.
However, he determined that the northern route would be the 
most, if not the only, efficient route to the Pacific-
The advantages of a northern route had been forcefully 
pressed upon Hill by one of Montana Territory's most 
exuberant promoters: Paris Gi bson. A recent arrival to the 
Territory, Gibson had operated one of the first flour mills 
in Minneapolis. Through his commercial interests he 
established a close personal friendship with Hill. The 
1873 Depression bankrupted Gibson and in 1879 he moved to 
Fort Benton, Montana Territory. Often called the "Father 
of Great Falls"— and later to become one of Montana's early 
United States Senators— Gibson pioneered in the sheep 
ranching business. At the same time he became an 
influential Territorial politician.(16)
Gibson maintained voluminous correspondence with his 
friend Hill. Through this communication, Gibson kept 
abreast of the Manitoba's activities. He realized the 
enormous benefits a transcontinental railway across 
northern Montana would have for the Territory. Always of a 
gambling and speculative nature, he also understood how the 
Manitoba could substantially feather his own private 
nes t . (17)
As early as 1881 Gibson had written to Hill that "no
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road can ever be built into Montana as cheaply as by the 
Northern or Milk River route."(18) To a railroad builder 
acutely sensitive to track engineering— as Hill 
was— Gibson’s inducements must have been particularly 
seducti ve.
Montana, however, represented to Hill more than vacant 
land to be crossed on the way to the Pacific. He had an 
interest, or more accurately, a potential interest, in 
Montana. He hoped to compete for the Butte railway market, 
for Butte was a mining area demonstrating fantastic 
opportunity.(19). He set his sights on an ambitious goal, 
for two transcontinental railways, the Union Pacific and 
the Northern Pacific, had already controlled that 
parti cular market..
Through a pooling agreement dating back to the early
1880’s, these two railways extorted exhorbitant freight
rates from the western Territory.(20) By offering the most
competetive rates. Hill hoped to seize the lion’s share of
Marcus Daly and William A. Clark’s freight service.
Writing to Daly in 1886, Hill promised that:
we hope to be able to furnish you all the 
transportâtion you want, at rates as will enable 
you to largely increase your business. What we 
want over our low grades is a heavy tonnage, and 
the heavi er i t i s the 1ower we can make the 
rates. (21)
Hill formulated a detailed strategy to achieve this end.
His first priority was to secure a rail line between
7
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Great Falls and Butte. Allying secretly m i th Charles A. 
Broadwater, President of the Montana National Bank of 
Helena, Hill established the Montana Central Railroad for 
this specific purpose. Chartered as an independent line, 
the Montana Central for all practical purposes was a 
wholly—owned subsidiary of Hill’s Manitoba. Only after the 
Manitoba reached Great Falls in 1887, however, did the 
Montana Central officially integrate into the Manitoba.
Hill then forged ahead with the construction 
preli minari e s . In 1886 he ordered grading to begin on the 
Great Falls—Helena line; at the same time he laid rail west 
from Devil’s Lake to Minot. These tasks prepared the way 
for the herculean westward drive planned for the summer of 
1887. Hill understood that the Montana Central must 
connect with the Manitoba, for without that linkage the 
Montana Central would probably die on the vine and surely 
be "gobbled" by the Northern Pacific-(22)
While completing in 1886 the engineering preliminaries 
for his extension into Montana, Hill also commenced the 
prodigious legal task of procuring access through the 
Indian lands of western Dakota and northern Montana 
Territories. In some respects Indian land issues were 
different than public domain or state land issues. For 
almost a decade the Manitoba and the Northern Pacific had 
battled to control rai1 service in Minnesota and the
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Territories of Montana and Dakota. During this period the 
issues remained generally local in focus and economic in 
nature. Lobbying was shifted from the territories to 
WashingtcHi, D.C.; new actors also emerged, changing from 
the "Copper Kings" to Congressmen, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior and, 
eventually, to the President himself.
Hill seemed confident in spite of the new shift, for 
politicians during the Gilded Age had often proved pliant 
to the needs of private economic interests such as the 
Manitoba. To Hill's surprise, lobbying Congress on Indian 
issues proved to be an arduous task. Moreover, rival 
interests such as the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific 
Railroads often tried to frustrate Hill's efforts. Hill 
had chosen to crack a surprisingly hard political nut. To 
his credit, he chose an extraordinari1 y capable lieutenant 
to do his bidding.
Hill chose Martin Maginnis, a highly successful 
Montana Territorial Delegate to Congress. The son of Irish 
immigrants, Maginnis moved with his family from New York to 
Minnesota when he was ten years old. Maginnis attended 
college in his home town of Red Wing, Minnesota, but the 
Civil War interrupted his studies. He established a 
brilliant war record, and by the war's end had achieved the 
rank of Major. The title stayed with him, and throughout
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hi s political career associates referred to him simply as 
"the Major." After the war he returned to his home in 
Minnesota, where he worked briefly for the local newspaper. 
Looking for new opportunities, he moved in 1866 to Montana 
Territory. After a year of occupational experimentation he 
returned to newspaper journalism. He edited the Daily 
Rocky Mountain Gazette (later to become the Helena
Independent), which at the time was the leading Democratic 
newspaper in the Territory.(23)
Elected as Democratic Territorial Delegate in 1872, 
Maginnis matured into an invincible politician. He reigned 
uninterrupted as Delegate until 1885. According to Clark 
Spence, the leading student of Montana Territorial 
politics, Maginnis was one of Montana's most capable 
territorial delegates.(24) Maginnis achieved success by 
protecting the special interests of the Territory's most 
powerful businessmen. Maginnis understood that political 
and economic stability went hand in hand. He cultivated 
the interests of powerful Democrats such as Samuel Hauser 
and Charles Broadwater, and Republicans like Thomas Power 
and Governor Benjamin P o t t s . (25) In what Kenneth Owens has 
called "a no—party pattern of territorial politics,"(26) 
Maginnis crossed party loyalties and cooperated extensively 
with Montana's Republican governors. In fact, Maginnis 
contributed as much as, or more than, any other factor to
lO
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the stability of Montana's politics in the late territorial 
period, particularly beginning with Governor Benjamin 
Potts' administration of 1870-(27)
Hill, however, needed not so much Maginnis' local 
skills as his influence in Washington, D.C- For twelve 
years Maginnis had ably represented his Territory's 
interests in the nation's Capitol. Typical of other 
western territories during the Gilded Age, Montana pursued 
policies which would attract outside investors and 
railroads, open up Indian reservations to white settlement, 
and gain independence from the federal government while at 
the same time procuring more federal military posts and 
other federal monies.(28)
Maginnis also believed that railroads controlled the 
destiny of the trans—Mississippi West. As a territorial 
delegate, he assisted in the passage of the 1875 general 
railroad right-of-way bill which facilitated the 
procurement of easements across public lands.(29)
Maginnis helped defeat Congressional efforts to reduce 
the size of the Army. He successfully secured a number of 
military forts for the Territory. These included Fort 
Missoula in the Bitterroot Valley, Fort Custer in the Big 
Horn Valley, Fort Keogh at the mouth of the Tongue River, 
Fort Assiniboine at the headwaters of the Milk River and 
Fort Maginnis in the Judith B asin.(30)
11
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The Major's experience in exti ngui shing Indian lands 
probably also impressed Hill. Maginnis successfully opened 
former Flathead lands in the Bitteroot Valley to white 
settlement under the pre-emption and homestead laws. He 
reduced several Crow holdings, including those in the 
Gallatin Valley. He also secured passage of the 1874 Act 
severing the Blackfeet claim to lands south of the Marias 
River.<31)
After hi s dozen year tenure as Delegate, Maginnis in 
1884 decided not to seek re—election. Instead, he threw 
his support to his virtually hand-picked successor, Joseph 
K. Toole. After serving the duration of the lame—duck 
session which ended in the spring of 1885, the Major 
remained in Washington to begin his duties with Hill.
Initial tasks included assignments in New York to meet 
with Northern Pacific executives and to ascertain their 
response to such activities as the Montana Central 
Railroad. In one meeting these Northern Pacific officials 
charged that James J. Hill and the Manitoba Railroad had 
intimate ties with the Montana Central Railroad. Maginnis 
denied these allegations, falsely stating that the Montana 
Central Railroad was "a purely local enterpri se. "
Moreover, Maginnis stated that Hill's interest in the 
affairs of the Montana Central was limited and that "only 
wantonly aggressive acts on their [[Northern Pacific's[] part
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Mould cause any one to push it out for eastern 
connections."(32)
Maginnis knew that Hill had played a leading role in 
the incorporation of the Montana Central Railroad. Hill's 
interest in the Montana Central was not limited to 
servicing the lucrative Butte market, he also had a 
signifiant investment in the Great Falls area. Paris 
Gibson, the so-called "Father of Great Falls" who as 
previously noted had encouraged Hill to route his railroad 
across northern Montana Terri tory, also extol1ed the 
potential of Great Falls. In 1884 Hill visited the Great 
Falls site and was impressed by its prospects for coal and 
hydroelectric development. Hill became increasingly 
involved in coal and land speculation in the area.(33) 
Although Maginnis was assigned to meet occasionally with 
other railroad executives, his principal task was 
unquestionably to lobby Congress and to secure the 
legislation critical to Hill's westward expansion.
As a thorough and meticulous tactician. Hill 
formulated a clear strategy to secure the easement across 
the impeding Dakota and Montana Indian lands. Indian 
removal constituted the fundamental goal in dealing with 
each tribe. Hi 11 defined removal as either away from the 
i nternati onal boundary (as in the case of the Blackfeet) or 
completely out of the Territory (as suggested to the Fort
1 3
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Peck Sioux). Failure to remove the Indians activated the 
second and fall-back objective; drastic reduction of 
reservation lands. Procurement of a right-of-way easement 
constituted the third and last objective. To cover all 
possibilities, and particularly the "worst—case" situation 
in which the Indians could be neither removed nor their 
lands reduced, the right—of—way would pertain to the 
reservations as they already existed. In spite of 
obstacles. Hill adhered doggedly to his plan.
Few documents demonstrate clearly the arguments Hill 
used to persuade federal officials to relocate the Berthold 
and Blackfeet Indians. The available evidence on this 
subject will be greatly expanded when James J . Hill's 
out—going correspondence, bound in fragile letterpress 
volumes, becomes available to the public. Reliable 
evidence does exist, however, which substantiates Hill's 
arguments to remove the Dakota Chippewa from their Turtle 
Mountain Reservation. Analysis of this latter case seems 
important for two reasons: First, both the Blackfeet and 
the Turtle Mountain Reservations bordered the Canadian 
international line. And second. Hill lobbied for removal 
from these three reservations <B1ackfeet, Fort Berthold and 
Turtle Mountain) at exactly the same time. One could 
reasonably expect some overlapping of supporting arguments. 
Hill presented his Turtle Mountain case quite explicitly.
14
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Between March and April, 1886, Hi 11 wrote the Interior 
Department (it remains unclear to whom in the Interior 
Department he communicated) and stated that the Sioux had 
recently occupied the Turtle Mountains, invalidating 
Chippewa land claims to the area.(34) Hill recommended 
that the Turtle Mountain Chippewa be relocated away from 
the i nternati onal border. He contended that United States 
reservations located near the Canadian border protected 
renegades and outlaws from both sides of the boundary.(35) 
Such reservations also encouraged Indian horse theft and 
other unnamed depredations. Hi 11 cited Canadian complaints 
of Indian raids and mischief— activities allegedly 
initiating from bordering reservations in Minnesota 
(probably the Red Lake Reservation) and the Turtle Mountain 
Reservaton in Dakota Territory.(36)
Hill also sent to the Interior Department maps he had 
secured from the Canadian Government which showed that 
every Canadian reservation was located away from the 
international border. Hill demonstrated that locations 
away from the boundary assured reliable rail service to the 
Indians. Relocating American Indian reservations away from 
the international boundary, he continued, would greatly 
reduce the number of Canadian Indians who were being fed by 
the United States Government, although he failed to 
elaborate. He further stated that augmenting the problem
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were unscrupulous Indian traders who, protecting their own 
interests, encouraged the United States Indians to oppose 
removal from the boundary.(37)
In contrast to the Turtle Mountain case, scarce 
evidence exists demonstrating Hill's arguments concerning 
the Fort Berthold and Blackfeet Reservations. The only 
substantive evidence is a June 14, 18G6 letter from
Maginnis to Interior Secretary Lucius Quintus Cincinatus 
Lamar (usually referred to as L.Q.C. Lamar).(38) Maginnis 
limited his discussion to the tribes of the Blackfeet 
Reservation. Contrary to Hill's case against the Turtle 
Mountain Chippewa, Maginnis speculated that the northern 
Montana tribes could be relocated to existing reservations 
of related tribes.
On relocating these Montana tribes, Maginnis stated:
I have no doubt that the Indians at the 
Fort Peck Agency, (sic) would be more than 
willing to rejoin their own nation the Sioux 
at one of the Sioux reservations. They were 
originally gathered at Fort Peck and cut off 
from the rest of their people, by parties who 
were interested in creating new agencies, and 
new fields for Government expenditure, if not 
for Government plunder.
The Assi naboi nes (sic) and Gros Ventres 
have natural affiliations with the Crow tribe 
and this tribe has ample room for them even 
if their reservation is reduced as it should 
b e .
The Blackfeet will be more difficult to 
deal with. Ail their blood and kindred are 
in British America, where they really belong 
themselves, and they have been in antagonism 
to most of the Indians on our side of the 
line; but I have the belief that if
16
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intelligently approached they would consent 
to a consolidation with some of the other 
tribes, or if they desired to be consolidated 
with their kindred, whom the Dominion 
authorities have now moved far north from the 
boundary line, with the best results <sic)
Perhaps it might be made a matter of 
international arrangement. This is but a 
suggestion, although if it could be carried 
out it would afford the most satisfactory 
solution of the matters of this tribe.(39)
Maginnis felt confident that all these tribes, even the
recalcitrant Blackfeet, could be displaced to other
locati one.
These tribes, however, shared different feelings 
about their homeland than those expressed in Maginnis' 
rather expedient and cavalier letter. Six months after 
Maginnis wrote this letter (as will be presented later), 
each tribe rejected federal offers to relocate.
In his letter to the Interior Secretary Lamar, 
Maginnis suggested that relocating the northern Montana 
Indians to existing reservations would also streamline the 
Indian Bureau's ability to deliver Indian services. auch 
a plan would decrease the number of Indian agencies and 
"greatly reduce" the Indian Bureau's budget. The Major 
warned the Secretary, however, that existing Indian agents 
would reate a great deal of opposition.(40)
Using such arguments as international problems,
Indian kinship bonds and governmental efficiency. Hill 
proceeded to translate his strategy into action. In late
17
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March or early April, 1886, and "with a great deal of 
trouble," Maginnis arranged a meeting in the Commi ssi oner 
of Indian Affairs' office to discuss the northern Montana 
Indian situation. The leading Senate and House Indian 
Affairs Committee members and the Indian Commissioner, 
J.D.C. Atkins, attended. The meeting lasted four hours 
and no agreement was reached. However, Maginnis drafted a 
bill that he felt would "catch all the shades of opinion" 
and which he felt confident all these politicians would 
support. On April 3 he gave his draft bill to Indian 
Commissioner Atkins for consi derati o n . <41>
Not surpri si ngly , Maginnis' bill would have removed 
the Indians of the Blackfeet and Fort Belknap agencies to 
the Crow Reservation and those at Fort Peck Agency to the 
Standing Rock Reservation, a Sioux reservation in Dakota 
Territory. Maginnis also included a section to provide a 
right—of—way through the Blackfeet Reservation. On April 
6, three days after Maginnis handed him the bill, Indian 
Commissioner Atkins recommended passage of the bill to 
Interior Secretary Lamar.(42)
In contrast to bills introduced in the early ISSO's 
dealing with the Blackfeet Reservation, Maginnis' bill 
sought to relocate these Indians away from the northern 
part of the Territory. Between 1882 and 1886,
Montanans— including Delegate Maginnis— ignored Indian
18
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removal as a policy alternative for the northern tribes.
In 1882 and in 1884, Delegate Maginnis introduced bills 
"to provide permanent reservati ons" for the varied tribes 
consolidated on the Blackfeet Reservation. In January,
1886, Montana Territorial Delegate Toole introduced a bill 
similar to those of his predecessor.(43) Moreover, even 
Indian Commissioner Atkins supported Toole’s 1886 
b i l l - (44) Each of these three bills would have greatly 
reduced the northern reservation, but none contemplated 
relocating the tribes away from the Missouri, Milk or 
Marias Rivers.
Within two weeks or by mid—April, 1886— Maginnis
changed his strategy slightly, deciding not to seek 
removal through a separate bill, but rather to do so by an 
amendment to the 1886 Indian Appropriations Act. This 
latter bill had already provided that a commission be 
appointed to negotiate with certain tribes in Minnesota 
and in the Idaho and Washington Territories. Maginnis’ 
amendment simply added the Fort Berthold and northern 
Montana tribes to the commission’s agenda. Consistent 
with Hill’s strategem, this amendment empowered the 
commission to negotiate for removal and, if necessary, 
land reduction.(45)
To assure control of the commission, commonly 
referred to as the Northwest Commission, Maginnis
19
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suggested to Hill that he Maginnis be appointed
Commi ssion chairman. He further advised Hill that the 
nomination should be initiated by someone other than 
himself.(46)
Selection of the Commission also worried Knute 
Nelson. A second—term Republican Congressman from Hill’s 
home state of Minnesota, Nelson sat on the House Indian 
Affairs Committee. Nelson fastidiously protected Hill’s 
railroad interests. Nelson, in fact, remained Hill’s most 
trusted Congressman and directed the House campaigns for 
Hill’s Indian relocaton and railroad right—of—way bills.
In May, 1886, Nelson reminded Hill that the Northwest 
Commission would be negotiating for land concessions from 
the Chippewa tribes of northern Minnesota. He emphasized 
that the status of these tribes, and particularly the 
bands on the Red Lake Reservation (located on the 
international boundary), directly affected Hill’s 
interests. Nelson suggested that Hill recommend to 
Interior Secretary Lamar candidates sympathetic to the 
Manitoba Railroad’s interests.(47)
Hill set immediately to the task. He wrote to Samuel 
Thorne, a New York businessman and member of the 
Manitoba’s executive committee, and asked him to recommend 
Maginnis to President Cleveland.(48) Hill also solicited 
Representative William L. Scott, then a second—term
20
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Democratic Congressman from Pennsylvania. An extremely 
wealthy railroad and coal magnate, Scott also maintained a 
close personal relationship with President Cleveland.
Hill asked Scott to personally recommend Maginnis to 
Interior Secretary Lamar or to President Cleveland.(49)
The Commission selection dragged into July. Despite 
recommendations from the Manitoba's friends, and despite a 
letter from Maginnis to Interior Secretary Lamar in which 
Maginnis subtly lauded his own credentials(50), Cleveland 
refused to appoint Maginnis to the Commission. Despite 
this setback. Hill forged ahead confidently.
Having secured possible removal of the Berthold and 
Montana Indians through the Appropriations Bill, Maginnis 
then proceeded to pursue the right-of-way as a separate 
and distinct bill. Probably at the Major's request. 
Senator Henry Dawes on April 29, 1886, and Representative
Nelson on May 1O, introduced to their respective houses 
almost identical right-of-way bills. Technically, Nelson 
substituted his bill for Delegate Toole's then outdated 
Montana permanent reservations b i l l . (51)
The Senate acted first on the right-of-way issue. 
Senator Dawes' bill was referred to the Senate Indian 
Affairs Committee which halved the proposed right-of-way 
easement from 200 feet to 1OO feet. Things progressed 
smooth1 y and by May 20 Senator Dawes reported the amended
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bill out of committee and to the floor of the Senate.(52) 
By late May, however, Hill faced his first major 
complication— the first in a series of obstacles which 
frustrated his Congress!onal lobbying campaign.
On June 1 Hill scribbled an urgent message to 
Maginnis. He ordered Maginnis to meet secretly with 
Indian Commissioner Atkins and find the best way to secure 
a right-of-way across the Fort Berthold Reservation. If 
Commissioner Atkins recommended a legislative 
solution— and Hill admitted that "the time seems 
late"— then the Montana right-of-way bill would have to be 
amended.(53)
Why the sudden change in strategy? Why had not Hill 
included the Fort Berthold right—of—way from the very 
beginning? Such a serious oversight would have been 
highly uncharacteristic of such a thorough strategist. 
Little evidence exists at this time to draw definitive 
conclusions. Probably Hill calculated that his extension 
from Devil's Lake to Mi not would proceed far enough 
northward to bypass the Fort Berthold Reservation. Henry 
Mi not, who directed the Manitoba's construction, might 
have encountered unexpected difficulties when building 
west from Devil's Lake and was forced southward. Whatever 
the complication may have been. Hill probably became 
cognizant of it in late May.
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Apparently Indian Commissioner Atkins did not 
recommend a legislative solution. On June 14 Maginnis 
advised Hi 11 to pursue executive action. Maginnis 
modified the objective, however, from a right—of—way 
easement to an Indian land cession.(54) Hill immediately 
concurred.(55)
Hill assigned one of his most trusted friends,
William E. Smith, to lobby Cleveland for the Fort Berthold 
executive order- Smith served at the time as Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury, but he soon resigned to become 
Solicitor for Hill's Manitoba. Smith had maintained a 
close personal relationship with President Cleveland.
Like Cleveland, Smith resided in New York and Smith had 
chaired the New York Central Democratic Committee during 
Cleveland's successful presidential campaign.(56) Like 
Représentât!ve William Scott, Smith provided an important 
link between Hill and President Cleveland.
Smith worked hard to procure the approval of Interior 
Secretary Lamar and the President Cleveland. Despite 
frequent consultations, the matter dragged on through late 
July. Cleveland agreed to open to public domain the 
northern eighteen miles of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 
but Interior Secretary Lamar balked. Smith applied even 
more pressure: "I am sending all our friends to
Lamar."(57) However, Secretary Lamar remained adamant.
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Nelson, realized that their pet "local bills" needed to be 
passed. Maginnis pleaded that Hill secure Representative 
Scott's assistance to expedite the bil l . (60)
Acknowledging the gravity of the situation. Hill 
pulled out all the stops. He wrote Representative Scott 
and explained that Maginnis, while pursuing legislation 
beneficial to his home territory, had encountered some 
legislative obstacles. Scott's assistance to Maginnis 
"will be ^  personal favor to me and to our friends, for 
which I will be glad any time to reciprocate."(61)
Scott responded. Hill's right-of-way bill was 
brought before the full House and passed on June 22. On 
June 23 the House Speaker and Senate President Pro—Tempore 
signed the bill.(62) This Montana right-of-way bill 
needed only the President's signature to become law.
To all observers. President Cleveland's approval 
seemed assured. However, on July 1 certain unnamed 
friends tipped Hill that officials from the Northern 
Pacific and the Union Pacific Railroads were secretly 
pressuring the President to v e t o . (63) Hill labored during 
the next week to confirm the rumors and to ascertain the 
President's posture on the matter. From a Montana source, 
whose reliability was "exceptional," and even directly 
from Northern Pacific executives. Hill verified the 
sabotage led by his chief railroad rivals.(64) Maginnis
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then reported to Hi 11 from Washington that President 
Cleveland might indeed veto the b i l l . (65)
Hill turned, once again, to his trusted confidant, 
William E. Smith. On July 7 Hill wired New York and 
ordered Smith to go to Washington and ascertain the 
President's objections to the right-of-way bill. On the 
same day. Hill wired Cleveland and pleaded that even if he 
did entertain objections, that he delay action until Hill 
could clarify any misunderstandings. "It can be 
absolutely shown that no public interest can be injured, 
but only served."(66) However, Hill needed more time to 
rally his forces. On July 7, 1886, the same day Hill
wired Smith and the President, Cleveland vetoed the 
bill.(67)
Cleveland apparently made his veto decision at the 
last minute, surprising his advisers and friends alike. 
Representative Scott confided to Hill that Interior 
Secretary Lamar recommended that the President sign the 
bill, but Cleveland vetoed it anyway.(68)
The veto shocked Hill. It coincided with other 
Executive disappointments, most notably Cleveland's 
refusal to appoint Maginnis to the Northwest Commission. 
Cleveland's betrayal of partisan politics particularly 
grated Hill. After all, Cleveland was the first 
Democratic president in a quarter— century, and Hill
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considered himself to be a loyal Democrat.(69)
Cleveland's actions also exacerbated regional
antagonisms. Représentâtive Nelson expressed the
frustration perfectly- Referring to Cleveland's veto and
the Maginnis rebuff, Nelson grumbled:
On the whole we are in the hands of the 
Philistines— A Democratic administration is not as 
kind to our Northwest as were our Republican 
admi ni strati ons— We are evidently regarded of no 
consequence.(70)
In spite of the disappointments. Hill remained optimistic.
The day after the veto he wrote to his trusted friend and
New York financier, John S. Kennedy, and confided to him
that: "This matter will not necessarily delay any of our
work, but gives some features of it an unpleasant
publicity."(71>
The obvious question remains: why did Cleveland veto
the right-of-way bill? Hill certainly suspected the
invisible hand of his railroad rivals. Or, as Cleveland
stated in his veto message, was the bill too general and
did it threaten Indian welfare?(72)
Senator Dawes, speaking for the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee, lambasted Cleveland's veto message. Dawes
countered that the right-of-way bill served both the public
and the Indian interest. Dawes' committee report also
implied that President Cleveland vetoed the bill for
reasons not publicly stated.(73) On cursory inspection,
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Dawes appears to have had a stronger case. If Cleveland 
genuinely believed that the Manitoba Railroad did not meet 
"the exigencies of the public service and the interests of 
commerce,"(74) then he supported his argument inadequately. 
Senator Dawes' committee rebuttal needs to be examined in 
at least some detail.
In his veto message. President Cleveland objected to 
the bill's general, ambiguous nature and to its violation 
of Indian consent and tranquility. As evidence of the 
bill's general nature, Cleveland cited sections one and 
two. Section one concerned railroad incorporation, while 
section two prevented any right-of-way holder from denying 
another railroad access through any pass, canyon or defile. 
Neither section specified the Manitoba Railway by nam e . (75) 
Senator Dawes demonstrated that both sections were 
copied almost verbatim from the 1875 general law granting 
railroad right —of —ways across public lands. Hill's 
right-of-way bill merely applied to the Blackfeet 
Reservation an already existing law. Dawes suggested that 
no one had yet criticized the 1875 law for its 
amUaiguity. (76)
According to Cleveland's veto message, the Manitoba 
bill would encourage land speculation. Senator Dawes 
countered that the bill conferred no rights of resale upon 
the easement holder. Furthermore, the concept of
28
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spéculai:ion proved illogical. Other railroads could route 
their lines anywhere that they desired within the Blackfeet 
reservation- Moreover, the 1875 public lands right-of-way 
bill protected competing railroads through narrowed 
passageways such as canyons.(77)
Senator Dawes closed this part of his argument using 
historical evidence. He pointed out that speculation of 
right—of—way easements on public lands simply had failed to 
materialize since 1875. Unfortunately, Dawes failed to 
follow his argument to its logical conclusion: Hill’s 
Manitoba, both in the present and in the reasonable future, 
faced no competitors in construction across northern 
Montana. In fact, Cleveland specifically stated as much in 
his veto message. When referring to the Blackfeet 
Reservation, Cleveland admitted that "No railroads are 
within immediate approach to its boundaries, and only one 
(the Manitoba), as shown on recent maps, is under 
construction in the neighborhood leading in its 
direction-"(78)
President Cleveland contended that the ManitcAxa 
Railway would not benefit the public because it would 
proceed through a “sparsely populated" territory.
Cleveland stated that he had "been unable to ascertain that 
the necessities of commerce or any public exigencies' 
justified approval, particularly when such a right-of-way
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"Mould affect so seriously the rights and interests of the 
Indians occupying the reservation." (79)
Senator Dawes responded only to Cleveland's charge 
that the projected railroad would injure the reservation 
Indian. Dawes contended that the railroad would facilitate 
exactly the opposite results- A railroad would eliminate 
the Blackfeet Reservation's isolation and enable the 
Government for the first time to provide service to those 
Indians during all seasons. Also the railroad would 
represent the harbinger of civilization, facilitating the 
Blackfeet's acculturation into the White society.(80)
Senator Dawes ignored Cleveland's statement that the 
construction of the Manitoba Railway through unsettled 
territory served no public interest. Dawes could have 
persuasively argued that railroad construction in the 
United States often preceded settlement, rather than 
followed it.
The thrust of Cleveland's other major objections 
related to Indian consent and welfare. He contended that 
the right-of-way bill provided no provisions for prior 
Indian consent— certainly a reasonable position. The 
President even admitted that he had grudgingly in the past 
approved similar bills which provided no means for Indian 
approval. These latter bills, he qualified, specified the 
name and routes of the particular railroads. He also
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rationalized approval of these latter right—of —ways because
they met "the exigencies of the public service and the
interests of commerce."(81>
Senates Dawes concluded his rebuttal by devastating
the President's consent argument. The Senator demonstrated
that on the same day that Cleveland presented his veto
message, he also signed into law a bill providing a
railroad right—of—way across Indian Territory— a bill
forced upon the Indians without their consent.(82)
Although certainly not an unbiased observer. Hill
summarized Cleveland's veto message rather succinctly:
Nothing but absolute want of knowledge and 
experience in such matters could have driven the 
President into the position he has taken for the 
reason that he gives is ridiculous, and against the 
acts and actions of Congress for the past forty 
years.(83)
Hill and Senator Dawes understood the situation.
Cleveland's message was in all probability a smokescreen, 
and never intended to be logical or consistent. It simply 
fulfilled Cleveland's Constitutional obligation to present 
a written message to Congress justifying his veto.
If Cleveland did not veto because of potential threats 
to public or Indian welfare, what then motivated him? As 
noted previously. Hill suspected— and in all likelihood 
correct1 y— that the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific 
Railroads had gained the President's e a r . How they 
convinced Cleveland is not known. Acutely aware that rival
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railroads were stirring up trouble. Hill wrote to the 
President and tried to clarify the Manitoba position.
Technically, Hill wrote to Willi am F. Vi 1as, the 
Postmaster General. Vilas, a friend of Cleveland, promptly 
forwarded the letter to the President. In his letter, 
dated July 15, 1886, Hill cited his evidence implicating
his rival railroads. Hill then defended his railroad 
extension through Montana, stating that his "Bill was 
originated by the People of Montana in an effort to secure 
relief from very oppressive railway charges."(84)
On July 20 Vilas responded. He praised Hill for the 
"moderation" of his July 15 letter. He then informed Hill 
that the President had reversed his position. If the 
"obnoxious features resulting from the general legislation 
in the vetoed bill could be removed," then the President 
would approve i t - (85)
Did Hill's letter of the fifteenth convince Cleveland 
of Hill's public interest? Or perhaps, had Hill's rivals 
so exaggerated the Manitoba's menace to the public that by 
the fifteenth Hill's plan appeared rather "moderate?" Or 
possibly, had Cleveland already realized that he erred in 
vetoing the bill and needed only an opportunity to inform 
Hill?
At this point, no absolute determinations can be 
made. The available evidence, however circumstantial,
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suggests that Cleveland had already realized that he made a 
mistake. Representative Scott, after a lengthy discussion 
with the President, confided to Hill that Cleveland all but 
admitted that the veto was a mistake. Scott added 
sarcastically, "The only wonder to me is he does not make 
more mistakes than he d o e s . '(86)
At the same time that he corresponded with Vi las (July 
15, 1886), Hill learned from Representative Nelson and
William Smith that the veto could probably be overridden in 
the Senate, but not in the House. Moreover, the First 
Congressi onal Session neared completion and little time 
existed to take other action.(87) Probably encouraged by 
the favorable Vilas response. Hill concurred with his 
advisers to regroup and submit a new bill when the Second 
Congressional Session commenced in December. When that 
session of the Forty—Ninth Congress reconvened on December 
6, 1886, Hill was ready to begin anew.
Hill's forces wasted no time. Montana Territorial 
Delegate Joseph K. Toole on December 7, 1886, introduced
Hill's new right-of-way bill to the House- This bill 
referred specifically to the St. Paul, Minneapolis and 
Manitoba Railway Company and also specified a detailed 
description of the projected route from Minot to Great 
Falls. The 200' easement of the vetoed bill was narrowed 
to 150'.(88)
3 3
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New provisions also appeared. Having failed to secure 
by executive order either an easement across, or a land 
cession from, the Fort Berthold Reservation, Hi 11 
interjected into this bill a clearly demarcated 
right-of-way across that Indian reservation. Also, 
responding to recent legal questions concerning access 
across the Fort Buford and Fort Assiniboine Military 
Reservations, Hill included a clause guaranteeing such an 
easement, contingent upon prior route approval by the 
Secretary of War.(89)
The House Speaker referred the bill to the House 
Indian Affairs Committee, who amended the bill so as to 
prohibit the transfer or mortgage of the right-of-way until 
the road was completed. On December 16 Representative 
Nelson submitted the amended bill and the committee report 
to the House floor.(90)
Representati ve Nelson's December 16 report evidenced a 
new committee vigor when compared to his report of the 
previous session. When Nelson had reported the vetoed bill 
out of committee the previous May, he submitted a mundane 
three paragraph report which hardly mentioned the Indians, 
and instilled little enthusiasm for the Manitoba.(91)
Nelson's report of December proved to be not only 
bolder, but also more ambitious. He scolded Congress for 
having not recognized long ago that the Fort Berthold and
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Blackfeet Reservations represented serious obstacles to
progress. He focused particular attention upon the
northern Montana Reservation. In caustic terms he analyzed
that reservati o n .
Upon it are located only three small Indian 
agencies, each hundreds of miles apart from the 
others, while all the intervening country is 
unoccupied. The game having been exterminated it 
is no longer even hunted over. This vast area of 
solitude seems to be maintained only as an 
impediment to civilization, preventing settlement, 
obstructing progress, forming a place of refuge for 
the lawless, and blockading the routes of trade and 
commerce so necessary to the welfare of the great 
mining towns and agricultural settlements of the 
Territory.(92)
Nelson used such polemics, however, not only to defend the 
Manitoba right—of—way, but also to serve an additional 
purpose.
Nelson usd his diatribe to applaud the cause of Indian 
removal! In language strikingly similar to that used by 
Hill against the Turtle Mountain Chippewa, Nelson recited 
the litany of i nternati onal border problems. He then 
specifically mentioned the Northwest Commission and their 
mission to negotiate for Indian relocation. Nelson 
supported removal of the northern Montana Indians from the 
international boundary to a "more hospitable valley, with a 
milder climate and more productive soil."(93)
Nelson knew that any agreements negotiated by the 
Northwest Commission had to be ratified by Congressional 
legislation. He sought to cultivate Congressional support
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■for any agreements secured by the Northwest Commission.
Not coincidental1y, the Commission's agreements with the 
Fort Berthold and Blackfeet Reservations were soon expected 
to be submitted to Congress. On the day that Nelson 
forwarded his report to the full House, the Commission had 
concluded its negotiations with the Three Affiliated Tribes 
and was travelling to meet with the northern Montana 
Indi ans. (94)
Representative Nelson's report included other unusual 
items. He childishly rebuked Congress for not having 
previously removed the northern Montana tribes. Had 
Congress already done so, his report contended, the 
Manitoba could have constructed across their homeland 
without special legislation. The Government, instead of 
obstructing railroads like the Manitoba, "should warmly 
encourage those who, desiring no subsidy and seeking no 
1 and grant, only ask permission, from their own resources, 
to give the Government and the People the benefit of other 
roads. *' (95)
Concerning Indian consent for a right—of-way. Nelson's 
House Indian Affairs Committee reasoned exactly as Senator 
Dawes had in his July veto rebuttal. The Executive needed 
no Indian approval for that part of the reservation 
encompassed within the 1855 Blackfeet Treaty boundaries.
For that part of the reservation created later by executive
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order, the Indians possessed no consent authority, for the 
Government had set aside the land only for occupancy and 
conferred no right to the soi 1. (96)
In contrast to Senator Dawes' previous and bitter 
rebuke of the President (concerning Cleveland's 
right-of-way veto). Nelson now explicitly wooed him.
Nelson praised the Executive for seeking a legislative 
right-of-way that could have been established by executive 
order alone.(97)
Once out of the House Committee, the bill faced little 
opposition. On December 22, 1886, the bill passed the
House as amended in Committee. On February 7, 1887, the
Senate passed the bill with one amendment: that not only 
the surveys and construction, but also the operation of the 
railroad be conducted with due regard to the rights of 
Indians.(98) The Senate voted to insist on its amendments 
and the conference committee agreed. On February 15, 1887,
President Cleveland, as he had promised Hill the previous 
July, signed the bill into law.(99)
Congressi onal legislation ratifying the agreements 
negotiated by the Northwest Commission remained the only 
element of Hill's campaign yet to be completed. The 
Commission concluded its Fort Berthold agreement on 
December 14, 1886, and its agreements with the northern
Montana tribes between December 28, 1886, and February 11,
37
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188 7 - (100>
The February, 1087 right-of-way bill protected Hi 11 in 
the event that Fort Berthold and northern Montana Indians 
refused to be relocated. Indeed, these tribes soon 
rejected Northwest Commission offers to be moved 
elsewhwere.
Beginning in mid—December, 1886, and continuing for
the next month, the Northwest Commission parleyed with the 
Fort Berthold and northern Montana tribes. In their final 
reports of the Berthold and Blackfeet councils, the 
Commission addressed the removal question only twice, and 
in only one of these two instances did it cite the Indian 
response. In that latter case, which concerned the Fort 
Peck Sioux, the Sioux were infuriated at the suggestion to 
move from their homeland. The commissioners had requested 
that the Fort Peck Sioux relocate to the Sioux reservation 
at Standing Rock. Concerning removal, the commissioners 
noted that the Montana Sioux "were decidedly opposed to 
such a change and manifested a good deal of surprise and 
uneasiness at the mere suggestion of the plan."(10 1 )
The Sioux argued that in the quarter century since 
their migration to the Fort Peck area, they felt themselves 
to be permanent residents in good standing. They indicated 
that none of the northern Montana tribes objected to their 
presence. Moreover, they noted that some of their members
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had recently moved to the Standing Rock Reservaton, but did 
not like it there- Considering the chilly reception to 
their proposal, the Commission concluded that it was 
"unadvisable" to attempt relocation.(102)
The Commission also reported its discussion of 
relocation with the Fort Belknap tribes. The commissioners 
suggested that the Fort Belknap Indians move to the Fort 
Peck Agency or to "any distant reservation,“ although they 
gave no specifics on the location of the latter. The 
commissioners failed to document the Indian response.<103> 
Documentation of its negotiations seemed a low 
priority to the Commission. Of all the Fort Berthold and 
northern Montana councils, only the proceedings with the 
Fort Peck Sioux were recorded. For "lack of necessary 
conveniences"— which the commissioners failed to
specify the Commission did not record discussions with the
Fort Peck Assiniboine. Regarding the Fort Belknap and 
Blackfeet tribes, severity of the weather and “lack of 
proper facilities"— also unspecified— explained the failure 
to record the tribal proceedings.(104) The Commission, in 
its final report, ignored altogether the issue of 
proceedings with the Fort Berthold tribes. Although the 
Commission failed to procure Indian removal, a primary 
interest of James J . Hill, it did secure another of Hi 1 i s  
objectives: enormous land cessions. The Fort Berthold
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tribes, in their December, 14, 1886 agreement, ceded what
the commissioners estimated to be 1,600,000 acres. Indian 
Commissioner Atkins later revised that figure to 1,950,000
acres an area equalling nearly two-thirds of the former
reservation. In return, the tribes received *800,000, 
dispersed in ten *80,000 annual payments.(105)
In negotiations between December, 1886 and February, 
1887, the northern Montana tribes relinquished considerably 
more land holdings than those of the Fort Berthold tribes. 
These Montana tribes ceded 17,500,000 acres— over 
three—fifths of their existing reservation. These Indians 
also agreed to the formation of three smaller 
reservations.(106) (See Figure 2)
The new reservations were located near the three 
existing agencies. The new Blackfeet Reservation, which 
provided services to the Piegan, Blood and Blackfeet 
tribes, was created near the former Blackfeet Agency. The 
Fort Belknap Reservation included the Gros Ventre and 
Assiniboine tribes, who continued to receive services from 
the Fort Belknap Agency. However, because of poor Indian 
relations with the Army stationed at Fort Assiniboine, the 
Commission recommended that the agency be moved farther 
eastward. Last, the Assiniboine and Sioux of the Fort Peck 
Agency agreed to a reservation which inluded their existing 
agency on Poplar Creek.(107)
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In return for their 1 and cessions, the northern 
Montana tribes agreed to federal payments totalling 
$4,300,OOO. The tribes agreed to annual payments extending 
over a ten year period. The Blackfeet consented to 
$150,OOO annually, the Fort Belknap tribes *115,000 and the 
Fort Peck tribes $165,000.(108)
The northern Montana tribes further agreed to a 
provision that certainly safeguarded James J. Hill's 
interests- These tribes permitted right-of-ways for 
railroads, highways and telegraph lines across any of the 
three reservations. Public need for such easements was to 
be determined by the President- The Secretary of Interior 
could, however, enjoin any conditions upon prospective 
easements in order to protect Indian interests.(109)
The right-of-way clause seems to be an unusual 
development, because the commissioners were authorized by 
the 1886 Indian Appropriations Act only to seek removal and 
Indian land reduction. Also worth noting, the right-of-way 
stipulation appeared only in the Blackfeet agreement, not 
in the Fort Berthold agreement.
The omission in the Fort Berthold agreement may not 
have been coincidental. The Fort Berthold agreement ceded 
all lands north of the Forty—Eighth (48th) Parallel, North
Latitude that is, all lands lying in Hill's probable route
west of Minot.(1lO) The Commissioners could have
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1ogical1 y concluded that a right—of—way clause was 
unnecessary because the Berthold tribes had just agreed to 
relocate south of Hill's probable route- No evidence at 
this time indicates any Hi 11 intervention into the 
Northwest Commission's negotiations. Regarding 
right-of-way easements- however, the Commission achieved 
ends curiously favorable to the Manitoba Railway.
The Northwest Commission knew that any agreements it
negotiated with Indian tribes were not legally binding
until approved fay Congressional legislation. Hill's
involvement in the agreement ratification process, at least
from available sources, remains incomplete. Unquestionably
he intervened, as evidenced in a September, 1887 letter to
his friend John S. Kennedy:
I took Senators Dawes, Morgan, and Davis of the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to the end of 
track through the Reservation and have their 
assurance that they will do everything in their 
power to secure the early ratification of the 
treaty which will throw nearly all that country 
open to immediate settlement.(Ill)
These Senators seemed to have kept their word.
The Blackfeet agreement, negotiated between December,
1886 and January, 1887, was submitted to Congress in 
January, 1888. The agreement was approved by Congressional
act on May 1, 1888.(112) Congress responded much less
promptly with the Fort Berthold agreement. Although 
submitted to Congress in January, 1807— almost immediately
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after tribal negotiations— the bill did not pass Congress 
until four years later, finally becoming law on March 3, 
1891.(113)
With ratification of the Fort Berthold agreement of 
1891, Hill achieved the last goal of the campaign that he 
and Maginnis had initiated in 1886. In practical terms, 
however. Hill had obtained most of his goals by 1888, when 
Congress ratified the Blackfeet agreement. Because of its 
enormous size, the Blackfeet Reservation reduction must 
have constituted a more substantial victory than the 
shrinking of the Fort Berthold Reservation.
Between 1886 and 1888, James J. Hill had secured 
impressive economic and legislative victories. In 
February, 1887, he obtained his right-of-way easement 
through the Indian lands west of Mi not. Had this 
right—of—way legislation been defeated, he was assured an 
easement by the terms of the Blackfeet agreement negotiated 
in 1887. In that same summer of 1887, Hill extended the 
Manitoba from Mi not to Helena. The following year, 1083,
the Montana Central completed its link between Butte and 
Helena. Also in 1888 Congress ratified the Blackfeet 
agreement negotiated the previous year and which opened 
northern Montana Territory to white settlement. In 1891, 
the northern part of the Fort Berthold Reservation passed 
into public domain.
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In spite of unexpected difficulties. Hill had achieved 
fantastic success. Maginnis had been a consummate 
lobbyist. Hill completed his Montana extension, tapped the 
Butte market, and helped open a vast territory to the 
public domain. Hill and Maginnis failed only in one goals 
Indian removal. The Fort Berthold and northern Montana 
tribes proved to be more defiant to Hi 11 and Maginnis than 
any other public or private party.
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A Note on the Sources
The emphasis of this paper has been the lobbying campaign 
by James J . Hill and Martin Maginnis to secure both a 
right-of-way through northwestern Dakota and northern 
Montana Territories and the possible relocation of the 
northern Montana tribes. The James J . Hill Papers in St. 
Paul were crucial in reconstructing the lobbying campaign. 
Presently public use of Hill's personal papers is limited 
to incoming correspondence. A voluminous series of 
documents in the Hill Papers will soon be microfilmed and 
will then be made available to the public. This will 
include a thirty—one volume series of Hill's personal and 
private papers. This latter series probably contains 
information particularly relevant to the topic investigated 
in this research paper. As indicated in the footnotes, a 
sincere note of gratitude is extended to the extraordinary 
service provided by the staff of the Hill Papers.
Legislative source materials were found almost exclusively 
in the Montana Indian Reservations Historical Jurisdiction 
Study. This exhaustive and masterful collection is now 
available on microfiche in the Mansfield Library at the 
University of Montana. The Historical Research Associates 
in Missoula, Montana were most cooperative in permitting 
access to the Jurisdiction Study.
A last emphasis of this paper has been the role of the 
Northwest Commission in dealing with the Fort Berthold and 
Blackfeet Reservation tribes. The commission's final 
reports proved to be the best source materials on the 
topic. Indian Claims Commission Dockets and Indian Agent 
annual reports were not exceptional sources on the role of 
the commission. Correspondence between the agents and the 
Office of Indian Affairs , stored in the National Archives, 
could be more fruitful concerning the affairs with the 
commission.
A Note on the Maps
Figures One and Two are original maps drafted by Douglas 
Killerud, a graduate cartography student at the University 
of Montana. The two sources used were Indi an Land Cessions 
in the United States, edited by Charles C. Royce (See the 
bibliography) and the official Great Northern map of 1891.
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